Exposition of the particular requirements and known methods relating to forward-secure logging devices may be gathered from the following documents:
[1] M. Backes, C. Cachin, and A. Oprea. Secure Key-Updating for Lazy Revocation. In Proceedings of European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 4189 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 327-346, Hamburg, Germany, 2006. Springer. ISBN 3-540-44601-X.
[2] M. Bellare. New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without Collision-Resistance. In Proceedings of CRYPTO, pages 602-619, Santa Barbara, USA, 2006. ISBN 3-540-37432-9.
[3] M. Bellare and B. S. Yee. Forward-Security in Private-Key Cryptography. In Proceedings of Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference, pages 1-18, San Francisco, USA, 2000. ISBN 978-3-540-36563-1.
[4] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk. Message authentication using hash functions: The HMAC construction. RSA Laboratories' CryptoBytes Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996. http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/˜mihir/papers/hmac-cb.pdf.
[5] E.-O. Blass and W. Robertson. TRESOR-HUNT: Attacking CPU-bound Encryption. In Proceedings Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 71-78, Orlando, USA, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4503-1312-4.
[6] S. Dziembowski and K. Pietrzak. Leakage-Resilient Cryptography in the Standard Model. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/240, 2008. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[7] S. Faust, K. Pietrzak, and J. Schipper. Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography. In Proceedings of Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, volume 7428 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 213-232, Leuven, Belgium, 2012.
[8] J. E. Holt. Logcrypt: forward security and public verification for secure audit logs. In Proceedings of Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research, volume 54, pages 203-211, Hobart, Australia, 2006.
[9] J. Katz and Y. Lindell. Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Chapman & Hall, 2007. ISBN 1584885513.
[10] D. E. Knuth. The Art of Computer Programming, Seminumerical Algorithms, volume 2, chapter 3.4.2, pages 139-140. Addison Wesley, 2nd edition, 1981. ISBN 978-0201896848.
[11] P. C. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology, pages 104-113, Santa Barbara, USA, 1996. ISBN 3-540-61512-1.
[12] Linux Kernel Documentation. /proc/sys/vm/dirty expire centisecs, 2015. Standard value is 30 sec on kernel 3.16.0-4, 64 bit, https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt.
[13] D. Ma and G. Tsudik. A New Approach to Secure Logging. ACM Transactions on Storage, 5(1), 2009. ISSN: 1553-3077.
[14] G. A. Marson and B. Poettering. Practical Secure Logging: Seekable Sequential Key Generators. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/397, 2013. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[15] G. A. Marson and B. Poettering. Even More Practical Secure Logging: Tree-Based Seekable Sequential Key Generators. In Proceedings of European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 8713 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 37-54, Wroclaw, Poland, 2014. Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-11211-4.
[16] S. Micali and L. Reyzin. Physically Observable Cryptography. In Moni Naor, editor, Theory of Cryptography, volume 2951 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 278-296. 2004. ISBN 978-3-540-21000-9.
[17] K. Pietrzak. A Leakage-Resilient Mode of Operation. In Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology, pages 462-482, Cologne, Germany, 2009. ISBN 978-3-642-01000-2.
[18] B. Schneier and J. Kelsey. Secure audit logs to support computer forensics. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2(2):159-176, 1999.
[19] A. A Yavuz, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter. BAF and FI-BAF: Efficient and Publicly Verifiable Cryptographic Schemes for Secure Logging in Resource-Constrained Systems. Transactions on Information System Security, 15(2):9, 2012. ISSN 1094-9224.
[20] Y. Yu, F.-X Standaert, O. Pereira, and M. Yung. Practical leakage-resilient pseudorandom generators. In Proceedings of Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 141-151, Chicago, USA, 2010. ISBN 978-1-4503-0245-6.